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OPTIMAL RULES FOR CARTEl. MANAGERS
WITH EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS rn THE
COPPER ANE) TEA MARKE1S
BJOHN UNDERw00I*
7i,is study de1eI0P aframework for measuring the expcctt'd gIll/I ((1 t?ie,nheroJ a prima,;.
coaunodi,v producer cartel !)t'namie world COntfliOditV market models are used in a slot/ia slit
control sjn to calculate the expected gain to ,,tenz hers of tea and copper cartels. On the
basis of present discountedia/ne 0/ e)port earnings, a tea cane! Would hate' a hor,ler/jne
chance of success, while chances Jr a copper torte! (no! inc/ut/tag the t....ant//or ('anacla
sou!d appear s/jut.
I.INl'ROflUCTION
OPEC ofl exports jumped from $21.1 billion in 1971to $120.9 billion
in 1974.' Assuming that the OPEC import price index increased by 20 per
cent per year. the 1974 oil export earnings of OPECti197 I dollars were
about $70 billion, so that the real oil earnings of OPEC members more
than tripled. Will other primary coinniodity producer groups he equally
successful?2
The purpose of this study is to develop a framework within which
to measure, at least to a first approximation, the expected gain to the
members of a primary commodity producer cartel. Then, that framework
is used to estimate the potential gain to cartelization for two primary
commodities, tea and copper. Dynamic world commodity market models
are used in a stochastic control setting to calculate the expected gain to
the members of tea and copper cartels.
As is usually the case in narrowing the scope of study, sonic poten-
tially important problems are ignored here. No attempt is made to calcu-
late the optimal timetable for cartel formation or duration. The problems
involved in maintaining a cartel as well as the potential effects of con-
sumer retaliation are ignored. These are serious and interestingquestions
and constitute topics for further research. However, a large expected re-
turn is almost certainly a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the
tDivisiou of International Finance, Federal Reserve Hoard. 1 he vicsss exprc,scd herein
are solely those of the author and do not nccessartlrepresent the vIcsss of thel:cdcril
Reserve System
Sources: IME. l,,ternaiional Financial Statistics. April. 1973 andApril. 1976. and
I B RD, Comniodjic l'rade and Price Trends. 1975.
2Several authors have discussed the possibility of success of other primal)producer
cartels. See, for example. Hergsten (1973 and 1974, Varon and Takeuch,.(1974) and
Stern and Tims (1975).
231formation of a successful cartel. Here, we are looking to see if thisCon.
dition is met in two commodity markets under a certain set ofassump
tions about the nature of those markets.
IIMoo1!. AN!) M ETHO!)
Welfare Measure and Con trot Variable
The welfare measure chosen for use here is the present discounted
value of export earnings. Some justification for using this measure must be
given since resources are employed in earning foreign exchange. Johnson
(1967, p. 156) has provided a compelling argument. He notes that it is im-
possible to ascertain whether less developed countries are over- or under-
exploiting their monopoly power in commodities with elastic demands,
while they must be under-exploiting it for commodities with inelastic de-
mands in the current price range. I-Ic then concludes that, pending further
research, one ought to accept maximization of foreign exchange earnings
as a safe minimal standard for optimal commodity agreement policy and
inelasticity of demand at current prices as a criterion for selection of
commodities for agreements.
The control variable used is an export tax, which is assumed to be
uniform across countries. Negotiations among poducer Countries would
be more likely to result in such a tax than in a diWcrent export tax for
each country. even though the expected gain is smaller than it would be
using country-specific taxes. The export tax increases expected export
earnings when the net demand curve laced by the cartel is price inelastic.
Control Framework
The commodity market models (linear with addative error terms) are
put into the following framework:
(I) H*x,* ± J*x7_1 + M*u, ± Lv,=
where x7 is the vector of endogenous variables,r, is the vector of exoge-
nous variables,3 u, is the scalar control variable (the export tax) ande
is the vector of error terms. The estimated coetTicients (HS,J*, M*.L) are
assumed to he known with certainty. e7 is assumed to bea vector oF
random variables with zero means and variances equal to the estimated
variances. Each exogenous variable is assumedto follow a first-order
autoregressive process of the form:
1Fxogenous variabks are mainv GN1". industrial productionindices and population
variab!e.
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where Y is a scalar and r is a serially uncorrelated error term with
mean
zero. Coellicients a were estimated by ordinary least S(luares. Againthe
estimated a are assumed to he known with Certainty and thevariance of
each r equal to the estimated variance. In vector form:
',- A*y,1= R
Using equations (I) and (2), we can incorporate x7 and v, intoa single






Since H is known and nonsingular, we can multiply both sidesof
by H-'. The resulting equation is written as:
x, = Ax, ,+BU, + V
The present discounted value of the cartel members' export earnings
can be expressed as
lix, + Jx,-,-i- Mu, =
where K, = d'K and d is the discount factor. K is a symmetric matrix con-
sisting of zeros except for certain oIl-diagonal elements, which are either
1/2 for each element which becomes the coefficient of the product of the
price and a cartel member's production or - 1/2 for each element which
becomes the coefficient of the product of the price and a cartel member's
consumption. Since each of these products appears twice, the resulting
sum is the yearly export earnings of the cartel countries,
Standard "certainly equivalence" stochastic control techniques5 can
be applied to equation (4) and (5) to calculate the maximal expected re-
turn to a cartel. The expected value of export earnings without a cartel is
calculated by setting u, = 0 for all 1, t = I.... T. The difference between
these two values is the expected gain in export earnings due to the pro-
posed cartel.
Some of the equations in the copper and tea models were thought
to have autocorrelated error terms. By applying a transformation similar
4These equations were estimated without constant terms.
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to the standard lutOregressive transformationin econometrics6 anev
vector stochastic first order diflerence equation with known
parameters and serially uncorrelatcd error termscan he derived.
C. ilie('o1nmn/it iMarii.'iModel.r
The selection of a commodity for application ofthe Optimalcontrol
technique was made with certain desirable attributes inmind. Thecom-
modity should he produced mainly in less-developedcountries (LDC's)
LDC's have displayed the most interest in suchcartels. Also, thewclftre
measure (present discounted value of export earningswas chosen with
1.DC's in mind. For a commodity to be of interest,short-run demtid
ought to he inelastic at current prices, given thewelfare meastireTo
facilitate the formation and main tenarice of an actual cartel, thereshould
be few producer Countries and fewor no potential large entrants.
There also had to he enough data available forestimation of a World
market mode! for any commodity studied, Ideally,one would like anac-
ceptable, already estimated linear world marketmodel which wouldirn-
mediately fit into the framework outlined in theprevious section.
These criteria were most nearly met fortwo commodities teaand
copper. There was an easily accessablecopper market model1 which
needed little adjustment to fit into thequadratic-linear framesyorkde-
scribed above. That model (like thetea model used) is, forreasons of data
availability, an annual one. Several equationswere re-estimated usinga slightly difFerent form. The linearizedversion of the coppermodel used
in calculating the expected returnto a cartel is given helow.
There are primary supply (mineproduction) equations for themajor
producer countries or areas, the UnitedStats, Canada, Ziiiihia,Chile
and the rest of the world.
(Cl)
MPUS =- 185.8 + O.7682pCU'1-i- O.6665MP1 + O.4cr
(C2)
MP = 39 62 + 0 08662PCU - 0 9782MP- O.4e+
6Assurn lug that the estimatedcoeflicients of iutocorreIationarc the true ones, we haic
--i +where A has /cros off the diagonaiandis a vector of eriaIiv unc&'rre- iated error terms with meantero. Using this equation iogeiher w liii(4L the system can cash) he tiansformeri into one havingserially uncorrelated error termsn,is augnienicd by .s,and u, See Underwood (1976),pp. 70 ii.
7See 1' ishr, Cootner andBaily (1972). It is a model oniy of thecopper mirket in cm countries. Eastern Bloc consumption,production and trade are ignored
For cumpleic ccoron1eresults, see Fisher, ('ooiner andDail(1972) and Under wood (1976)
assuming that "purchasing power parity"holds, we can ss rite all pricesin lena of 1967 U.S. dollarsper mcirnj ton. Quantity variablesarin units of millions ofmeiricions
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+ r,jsp= 16.1 + O.Ol536PCU + O.9477MP iO.lc
= 54.52 -+-O.1334PCUfl° + O.9477MP,- O.2e1f
(CS)
iP= 28.13 +O.224PCLJ1' + O.8836MP- O.5e°' ±
These were estimated as "stock adjustment" type niine production (M P)
equations. Primary copper in the U.S., Canada and, for the most part.
Chile moved at the U.S. producers' price during the period of estimation.
This price tends generally toward the London Metal Exchange (LME)
price but is set by major U .S. producers and is often unchanged for weeks
or even months)° Aprice representative of the producers' price (but ad-
justed for the small fraction of primarV copper in the U.S. that moves at
the LM F price) is taken from theEngineering and Mining Journal(EMJ).
The copper primary supply equations are generally characterized by low
speeds of adjustment, as shown by the cocflicients of lagged mine pro-
duction.
Three secondary supply equations are estimated. Production from old
and new scrap in the United States and total production from scrap for
the rest of the world.
OS= 329.5 + O.lO55PCU +
NS5 = - 196.1 + O.3649DC5 +
SC= 655.6 + O.t423PCU+ O.O2677K' - O.O4846SC
+ O.4e1 +
No significant price effect was found in the equation for the produc-
tion of copper from new scrap (scrap generated in the production of cop-
per products). KRis a measure of the total amount of copper available
for collection in rest of the world. A similar variable constructed for the
United States was not found to be significant in a linear equation for cop-
per production from old scrap. The U.S. scrap market price moves closely
with the LME price.
Copper consumption (DC) equations were estimated for four areas,
the U.S., Western Europe. Japan and the rest of the world.
0 See Fisher. Cootner and Baily (1972),pp. 571 573 for a discussion of the two-price
system in the world copper market.
2351/(j
(C9)
DCS= 0.2414 - 0.3808PCU' + O.04s89l)AJS + 3.670lJiS
+ 69.69ID'-- I36.6lD" + 66.94lD'1 + O.95521)Cis
0.4e- +
(Cl 0)
DC = 1,220- 0.27I4PCU-+ 2.830PA+ 9.045I
+ 0.5426DC- 0.let +
(CII)
DC = 153.7 - 0.l357PCU-+ I.7831+ e
(C 12)
DCW171.60.094.32PCU' + 0.2444PA± 6.75J
0.0l969DC+ O.4e' WC
The consumption equations, except for Japan,are also postulated to be
of the "stock adjustment" form. Besides theprice of copper, themost im-
portant determinants of the demand forcopper are industrial production
(in index form: I) and the price of its mainsubstitute, aluminum (PA).
Current and lagged real values of inventoriesof durable goods (ID)are used in the U.S. equation tocapture the change in copperinventt,rjes held as finished goods. Data problemsprevented the use of inventor)
variables in other consumption equations.
Three price equations were estimated:
PCUMJ= 0.9763PCU O.1534PCU,iME + e
pCurR = 277 5- 0 8298STC-'1 + 0.8298STCS20 Ol7'6DC51
+ 0.2694pcu:E + 0.3289PCU1+ 0.2e1+ ÔPR
(C IS)
PCUM= --784.1 - O.6204STCw + 23.00I' +0.22l4PCUE
+ 0.5e+ 5"
The EMJ price is estimatedas a function ol' the U.S. producers'
(PR) price and the LMEprice. U.S. producersare assumed to adjust
their prices basedon the level of consumption andthe change in stocks
levels (SIC) in the U.S.and on last year's LM F price.This price, on the
No evidence of a laggedadjustment process could he found forJapan.
236other hand,is basically a free market price.Itis determined simul-
taneouslY with the othervariables in the model.




The obvious identities closethe modeL The price of aluminum is taken
as exogenous, asis the price of coffee in the tea model. This is certainly
not the case; however,it would be a monumental task to create and esti-
mate useful aluminum and coffee models in order to make these prices
endogefloUS.
The world tea market model presented here is more loosely based on
an earliermodel.'2It represents the world black tea market. However,
exports from the green tea producing and consuming areas, mainly China
and Japan, are included in "rest-of-world production." Net imports of
black tea into the Eastern Bloc are included in "rest-of-world" consump-
tion 13.14
Partial adjustment supply equations were estimated for India, Sri
Lanka, East Africa and the rest of the world:
(TI)
S=2,192+320900p1US-- 09495S- 0.5e,+
SL =7,279+142 j0Øp1lJSO.8988S, - 0.4e-1
SA =3,006 + 27,04lPT± l.093S, - 0.9e+
S=39,390 + 608,lO0PT+ 0.8344S+ 0.4e+
The coefficients of lagged supply are close to unity, indicating a slow
rate of adjustment of output to a price change. For East Africa, this co-
efficient is greater than one, so that the effect on supply of a price change
never dies out. The supply model used here, while simple and convenient,
is probably just too simple to expiain adequately the tremendous expan-
sion iii East African tea production since World War II.
Demand equations were estimated lot the United Kingdom, India,
the United States, Canada, Australia and the rest of the world.
t2See Murtj (1966).
13For complete econometric results, see tindcrssood (1976).
'4By assuming that "purchasing power parity" holds, we can write all prices in terms
of 1967 dollars per kilogram. Quantity variables are in units of metric tons.
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DJK =- IS 100 - 82 5o0P15 + 25 l30P(' -2 346PCy,K
-i-I4,730POP' +
= - 109,700 - 303,900PT"25,55OP('+ 0.2499yj'
-- 605.6P0P +
= 11,000 - 29.23opT5 + 775p('USl46.lY
-1- 8839POP + e1
= - 1.720247SOPTS 1 6.271 PC5- 106.2Y;'
+ 4.l19POP' -t- e7
(Ti0)
DW= -365,800 -- 20,830PT+ 10,440t ± e
Besides the price of tea, themost important determinants of teademand arc the price of its main substitute, cotfec (PC),population (POP) anda
measure of income, either real income (Y),an index of real income (Yl)
or an index of per capita real incomc(PCYJ).
A "partial adjustment"deniand-for-stocks (ST) equationwas also
es tim a ted:
(Til)
ST, = 74,460- 9.l08PTS + 0.4221ST,+ 0.014991),+ e'
The demand for stocksincreases as total world demand(1)) increases.
The obvious identitiesclose the model.
It is interesting tonote that LDC producergroups already exist for
both commodities In 1967CIPEC (the Frenchacronym for the Inter-
governmental Council of CopperExporting Countries)was formed by Zambia, Zaire, Peru andChile. Its originalpurpose was to "halt the drift in copper pricesto levels that would not heconducive to the orderly de- velopment of the world'scopper market and industry."However, CIPEC did not actas a cartel during the period fromwhich the data used in estimating thecopper model were drawn (19461968).
5See Hohan and Taran(1914), p tO.
238There have been International TeaAgreenients off andOn since 1933.
An agreement in ellect from 1933 to 1938 (signedby India, Ceylon,In- donesia, Malaya and the British I,St Africanterritories) limited thee-
pansion of the acreage and restricted eXl)OrtS, It''worked relatively well
in maintaining prices." 6 The sporadicagreements since 1938 havenot been effective)7
Ill. RESUI.T5
A. A Copper Cartel
The copper market model was estimatedusing data from theyears.
1946 through 1968. The cartel is assumedto begin its operation in 1969.
The expected gain is calculated in twostepsFirst the present discounted
value of expected export earnings (in 1967dollars) of the cartelcountries
is calculated assuming that no cartel exists.. Thenthe present discounted
value of optimal export earnings iscalculated. The difference is theex-
pected gain due to the cartel.'8 The cartelis assumed to operate forup to
ten years. Two different discount ratesare used, five and ten per cent.
The results for a ten-year cartelare presented in Table 1. Theex-
pected gain in each case is about 2.5per cent of the no-cartel expected
TABLE I
EXPEUTIl) RETURN To A TiYEAR Copp,CARTEL,
(IN Mit LIONS 8)1' 1967 DOLIARS)
Optimal Return
No-Cartel Return
Gain due to CartJ
(Expected Export Tax-
Fifth Yr.)
I. Discount Rate: lOper cer.t
No A ulocorrclatioji A utocorrcla(ion
33,072 33,148
32,274 32.348
798 (2.50) 800 (2.5°)
(S280 per metric ton) ($216 per metric ton)
2. 1)iscoumit Rate: 5 per cent
'6SeeIBRD(1972),p. 3.
'1SceIBRD(1972),pp. 13IS.
'81t is assumed that there are no costs to forming and maintaining the cartel.
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Optimal Return 43.921 44,009
No-Cartel Return 42,845 42.930
Gain due to Cartel 1.076 (2 .5°) 1,079 (2.5°c)
(Expected Export Tax-
Fifth Yr.) (S20 I per metric ton) (S2 16 per metric ton)a
TA13IE 2
ExpFcrFt, RETURN TO COPPER CARTElS OpiRAriN(; FROM ONEIn T,s YFARSa




Due to the Cartel
(Millions of (Percent of No-carid
1967 I)oIlar) Expected Earnings
aThese results arc from calculations using themethod that takes intoaccount thes- timated coefficients of autocorrelation and usinga discount rate often per cent.
return. The results are quite similar whetheror riot the assumed autocor.
relation is ignored. This is simply becausethe differences between thepre-
dicted and observed values in 1968,the year in which the cartelgains are
calculated, arc quite small. Thereforethe original observede0 and the
expected values of later e,'s. which decline in absolutevalue at geo-
metric rates,'9 have only a small effecton the final results.
The argument is sometimes madethat, because the short-runprice elasticity of demand fora product like copper is much lowerthan the long-run elasticity,a cartel operating for a very short periodcould in- crease export earnings dramatically.Therefore, the expected gainsto cop- per cartels planning to operate fromone to ten years were calculated.
The results are presented inTable 2. Relative to no-cartelearnings, the expected gain is largest fora six-year cartel, 5.3 per cent.











tO 800 (25°,)B. A Tea Cartel
The tea cartel considered would Consistof India, Sri Lankaand the main East African tea producing countries(Kenya, Uganda, Malawi,
Mozambique and Tanzania). This cartel isassumed to operate brup to
ten years beginning in the first post-sampleyear, 1972.
The results for a ten-year cartelare presented in Table 3. Thecalcu-
lated expected gain averages about 29per cent of the no-cartel expected
return. Again, and for the same reason, ignoringthe estimated coeflicients
of autocorrelation changes the results only slightly.
Table 4 gives the results for cartels operatingfrom one to tenyears.
This time, the expected gain (relative to theno-cartel expected return) is
highest for a one-year cartel. In dollar termsthe gain to aone-year cartel
is over one-half of the gain to a ten-year cartel.
Again these calculations are made withouttaking into account the
post-cartel future. To partially take this futureinto account the expected
gain over the first ten years of a twenty-yearcartel was calculated and
found to be $824 million, 24 per cent of theten-year no-cartel expected
return.
Why is the percentage expected gainso much higher for a tea cartel
than for a copper cartel? Stern and Tims (1975)speculated that a copper
cartel would have a fair chance of realizinga sizeable gain but gave a tea
cartel little or no chance of success. Essentially, thenet demand curve fac-
TABLE 3
ExrtcTEo RETURN TO AN INDIA-SRI LANKA-EASI AKIc TEA CARTEL
(IN MuIIoNs OF 1967 DOLLARS)
I.Discount Rate: 10 per cent
10-year Cartel-
No Autoccjrrelation










Gain due to Cartel 963 (28.5°,,)
(Expected Export Tax-
Filth Yr.) ($1.05 per kg.)
Optimal Return 5,445 5.358
No-cartel Return 4.259 4,158
Gain due to Cartel 1,186 (278°:) 1,200(28.9°,,>
(Expected Export Tax-
Fifth Yr.) ($0.93 per kg.) ($0.98 per kg.)TAttlE 4
EXPicru> RIrtKN Ii)151)1k-SRI EANKA-lASi AIRIlA lEA (ski II
OpFRATrcc; FKOl Osr To[EN YEARS
Number of Years oi
Cartel Operation
Expected Gain





aThese results were calculated using the method thatignores autocorrel:itj>n and using
a discount rate of ten per cent.
ing the copper cartel is notvery inelastic at current prices. Estimated long-
run primary supply elasticity isquite highinthe United Statesand
Canada, the two primary producer countriesnot in the cartel, l'he in-
crease in production of copper from scrap with theintroduction of a
cartel also contributes to the small expectedgain.
IV. Coctusios
As was stated in the introduction,a large expected return can he
thought of as a necessary, butnot sullicient, condition for thesuccessful
formation and maintenance ofa cartel, Is this condition fulfilled for the
tea cartel considered above? A 29per cent increase in export earnings
from tea is certainly nothing likethe 500 per cent increases in totalexport
earnings experienced bymans' of the OPEC countries.It amounts to
about one billion 1967 dollarsover ten years to he splitamong seven
countries. Assuming that the gainsare split such that each country hasan
equal increase in expectedtea export earnings, the gain intotal export
earnings, as a percentage ofrecent average total export earnings, would
range from about I per cent forTanzania to! 3 per cent For Sri Lanka.
This tea cartel wouldseem to have, at best, a borderline chanceof success
Based on the resultspresented here, the chances forthe successful for-
mation of a coppercartel by CIPEC orany other producer group not in-
cluding the United Statesand/or Canadaappear remote. This is not to say that no type of international





























(285°,,)cyclical fluctuations in copper export earnings would he ofhendjt to
countries like Zaire and Zambia which suffered due to the lowcopper
prices of the recent world wide recession.
REFERENCES
[I] Aoki. NI., Opt ,mi:at,on 0/ Stochastic Systems. Academic Press. New York, 1967
12) Bersten. C. F.. 'The New Era in World Commodity Markets," ('!rrillenge September
October, 1974. 34 42.
13] , "The Threat from the Third World," Foreign Poller. No. II, Summer, 1573,
102 124.
[4] Chow, G. C., Anal i'si.s and Control of Drnwnjc tcon,mjc S sterns, Wiley, New York,
1975.
(5]Fisher, F.. Cootner, P. and Baily. M.. ''An Econometric Model of the World Copper
Industry," Bell Journal of Eeonmnjt.c and Management Sciences, Autumn, 1572, 568
609.
(6) Goreu,L.. Kendrick, 1). and Kim, H., "Feedback Control Rule for Cocoa Market
Stabiliiation,''inV .l.abys (ed), Quantituziie Mode/s of Commodity Markets,
Ballinger. Cambridge, 1975.
Hohan, C., and Tarm S.. "Access to Rcsourccs The Case of Cartelj,ation Among
Copper Producers," mimeographed, presented to the Master of Science in Foreign Ser-
vice Program, Georgetown University. April 1974.
International Bank for Reconstruction and F)evcloprnent, "The International lea
Market: Review and Outlook or Hank Lending," mimeographed, I)cccmhcr 14, 1972.
[9! Johnson, H. (i.. Economic Policy Thwards Less Deee!oped ('ounlrit'.c. Urookings, \Vash-
ington. D.C., 1967.
[101 Kofi, 1. A., "International Commodity Agreements and Esports Earnings, Sirnulston
olthe 968 Draft International Cocoa Agreement, FooiI Research Studies, Vol. II. No.
2,1972, 177 201.
[II] Mikdashi. A., "Collusion Could Work," Foreign Policy. No. 14. Spring. 1974.57'7.
[121 Mikcsell, R. F., "More Third-World Cartels Ahead.tm" Challenge, November I)eccm-
ber, 1974, 24 31.
[131 Murti, V. N., An Econometric Model of the World 7'a Economy, unpublished Phi). dis-
sertation, University of Pennsylvania. 1966.
[14) Stern, W., and Tinis, W., "The Relative Bargaining Strength of the Developing
Countries." American Journal ofAgricultural Economics. May, !975, 225 235.
[IS) Llnderwood, J., Optimization Rules for Producer (iroup.c in a Stochastic Market Setting.
with Application to the C'opper and lea Markets, unpublished PhI). dissertation. Uni-
versity of Minnesota, 1976.
1161 Varon, B. and Takeuchi, K., "I)eveloping Countries and Non-Fuel Minerals.foreign
4/lairs. April 1974, 497 510.
243